2
In section 2 I turn to Villanueva's main challenge. He suggests that, to put it very briefly, descriptive facts can be reasons. Therefore, even if the content of the law depends on reasons, it does not follow that law practices cannot themselves determine the content of the law.
Villanueva proposes a value-neutral criterion -textualism. In other words, he suggests that the descriptive facts about the meaning of legal texts are themselves reasons that determine the contribution of law practices to the content of the law. This suggestion depends on too shallow a conception of the requirement of reasons. For the law to be rationally determined, it is not enough that there be some value-neutral criterion that specifies that law practices have certain consequences for the content of the law. There have to be reasons that explain why that criterion, as opposed to all others, is the legally correct one -the one that, in the relevant legal system, determines the contribution of law practices to the content of the law. 7 Normative facts are the best candidates for such reasons. And, in fact, Villanueva's textualist criterion derives its appeal from normative facts.
Rational determination and supervenience
It is uncontroversial that the content of the law supervenes on descriptive facts -that is, that the descriptive facts modally determine the content of the law (HFML, p. 159 Villanueva questions the need for me to appeal to rational determination. His suggestion seems to be that I could substitute a thesis about the supervenience base of the content of the law -i.e., about the modal determinants of the content of the law -for a thesis about the rational determinants of the content of the law (Villanueva 2005, p. 2).
Rational determination is a kind of ontological relation, more specifically a kind of constitutive or making-it-the case relation. Supervenience, by contrast, is a modal relation. In my view, it is a mistake to try to cash constitutive claims in modal terms, though this is not the place to argue the point (see Greenberg 2005c) . In fact, it is natural to appeal to constitutive truths to explain modal ones. For example, that the A facts constitute the B facts explains why the B facts supervene on the A facts.
I maintain that descriptive facts and normative facts together rationally determine the content of the law. It follows that the content of the law supervenes on descriptive facts and normative facts (HFML, p. 163 Villanueva suggests that rational determination "is the form that . . . the supervenience relation" takes in the case of law (Villanueva 2005, p. 2) . In light of what I have just said, it would be better to say that rational determination is, in the case of law, the form taken by the constitutive relation between determining facts and the facts they determine.
Reasons all the way down
Villanueva begins the second, main part of his paper by raising a question about the nature of my argument that legal content depends on normative facts. He takes me to begin from the claim that judges, in ascertaining the law, must appeal to normative facts. Some side remarks in HFML are no doubt the source of the misunderstanding (pp.
160, 164 & fn. 17). I point out that my explanation of the rational determination relation
employs the notion of a reason, which may well be best understood as an epistemic notion. Thus, one interesting feature of rational determination is that it may be an example of an ontological relation that has an epistemic component. As an example, I
consider the possibility that the notion of a reason might be spelled out in terms of the notion of an ideal human reasoner. is. Even if a judge does not mention normative facts, they may be among the reasons supporting the relevance of the factors that the judge does mention.
11 Another example of a position that makes the metaphysics of a domain depend on an epistemic element is Donald Davidson's well-known view of the mental. According to Davidson (1984a; 1984b) , what beliefs and desires a person has depends constitutively on which overall interpretation would make the person most intelligible. See HFML, p. 164 fn. 18 and p. 171, fn. 25 7
In light of this clarification, Villanueva's objection has to be not that a judge could cite only value-neutral criteria, but that value-neutral criteria could by themselves determine the contribution of law practices to the content of the law. In HFML, I
introduced the notion of a model of the role of law practices in contributing to the content of the law -a model, for short (pp. 178-179). In these terms, Villanueva urges that the legally correct model -the one that determines the contribution of law practices to the content of the law 12 -can be (or can be supported by) a value-neutral criterion.
Villanueva's main example of a value-neutral criterion is "keep[ing] as close as possible to the law's text" (Villanueva 2005 , p. 5). 13 A judge can give as a reason for a conclusion about the content of the law that the conclusion "fitted better the legal texts than any of the alternatives available" (p. 5).
Let us waive internal problems with the fitting-the-text criterion, 14 and assume for purposes of argument that we can construct a coherent and workable model that resolves questions about the relevance of law practices to the content of the law in a value-neutral textualist way. Villanueva suggests the model for law practices generally, but in order to make the discussion concrete, I will focus on statutes and judicial decisions. Presumably a fitting-the-text model would take a statute to contribute to the content of the law the plain meaning of the statutory text. The case of judicial decisions is more complicated.
A decision can involve multiple opinions or no opinion, and judicial opinions do many 12 For the notion of legal correctness, see above note 7. 13 For a related objection, see Ram Neta's purported legal counterexample to my argument (Neta 2004, 12-13) . My reply to Neta is relevant to Villanueva's objection as well (Greenberg 2005a , see especially the last three paragraphs but one of section 2 and the last paragraph of section 3). 14 Fitting the text does not seem to be a criterion that does the work required of it. Even if we ignore aspects of law practices other than texts, the law does not have a text. Rather, there are a vast number of texts associated with law practices. In HFML, I show that there is no direct or automatic route from the meaning of texts to the content of the law. The problem of legal content is not the problem of somehow amalgamating the meanings of myriad texts (HFML, Section III).
things other than (purport to) announce legal norms. To fix ideas, we can understand a fitting-the-text model for judicial decisions as follows: in a judicial decision where the majority opinion makes a clear statement of the decision's relevance to the law, the decision's contribution to the content of the law is that stated by the majority opinion.
(This model is of course not the correct or operative one in Anglo-American law;
consider, for example, a judicial opinion that purports to announce a legal rule that goes beyond what is necessary to resolve the case before the court.) 15 Why isn't the fitting-the-text model a reason that could determine the contribution of law practices to the content of the law? That the model would, if applied to law practices, yield some legal norm does not by itself provide a reason why law practices support that norm. 16 What is further needed is a reason why the significance of law practices is determined by the fitting-the-text model, as opposed to competing models. In the case of statutes, there are competing models that would make the contribution of a statute depend on, for example, the intentions of legislators, legislative history, or the principles that would best justify the enactment of the words of the statute. In the case of judicial decisions, competing models would make the contribution of a judicial decision depend on the narrowest rationale that would justify the result in the case, the rationale that would best justify the outcome, or the reasoning that the judges relied on (which may be in tension with what the judges say the impact of the decision is). The point is that these reasons for and against the model are, or appeal to, normative facts, such as facts about whose will should govern or about what is fair.
These normative facts lie behind the plausibility of the fitting-the-text model with respect to statutes. When one appeals to the plain meaning of the words of a statute, one implicitly appeals to the familiar reasons why the meaning of statutory texts should be respected. Villanueva neglects the possibility that normative facts are playing this role.
17
In HFML, I argue more generally that normative facts are the best candidates for reasons favoring some models over others. I discuss this objection more thoroughly in Greenberg (2005b) . In brief, the parallel drawn by the objector (between an appeal to normative facts and an appeal to descriptive facts) is merely formal. Descriptive facts cannot determine their own relevance to the content of the law (HFML, 185, 187) . By contrast, normative facts determine their own relevance. 
